The Judicial Service Commission is the constitutional institution responsible for supporting the independence, integrity, competence and institutional strength of Eritrea’s judiciary. Article 53 of the Constitution establishes the Commission and requires its organization, powers and duties to be determined by law.
The Commission’s constitutional mandate centers on judicial service. It conducts recruitment and submits proposals for the appointment of Supreme Court Justices other than the Chief Justice and for the appointment of judges of the lower courts. It also makes recommendations concerning the terms and conditions of judicial service.
Supreme Court Justices, other than the Chief Justice, and judges of the lower courts are proposed by the Commission. From among the proposed candidates, the President of Eritrea makes the final selection or appointment, subject, in the case of Supreme Court Justices, to the approval of the National Assembly. The appointment of the Chief Justice follows a separate constitutional process involving selection by the President, approval by the National Assembly, and formal appointment by the President. The Commission has no legal authority to select or formally propose a candidate for Chief Justice. It may, however, promote transparency concerning the appointment process and informally evaluate or comment on potential candidates. Nothing prevents the President or the National Assembly from requesting or considering the Commission’s views and expertise even in the appointment process of the Chief Justice.
An expanded responsibility to serve the judiciary
The proposed Judicial Service Commission Act gives the Commission a broader statutory responsibility for the institutional service and administration of the judiciary. This unified structure avoids creating a separate judicial-administration body whose responsibilities would substantially overlap with those of the Commission. It also places judiciary-wide administration within an autonomous constitutional institution rather than an ordinary executive agency.
Under the draft Act, the Commission would adopt national policy for the institutional support and development of the judiciary. It would prepare a consolidated judicial budget and establish standards for court registries, records, facilities, accessibility, interpretation, security, public information, technology and cybersecurity.
The Commission would also establish merit-based frameworks for nonjudicial court personnel, collect and publish reliable judicial statistics, support evidence-based allocation of personnel and resources, and recommend court stations, circuits and institutional reforms under the Judiciary Establishment Act.
The Administrative Office of the Judiciary
The Commission would deliver judiciary-wide operational services through the Administrative Office of the Judiciary. The Administrative Office would support the courts in areas such as finance, procurement, facilities, human resources, records, technology, language access, security and public information.
The Administrative Office would be institutionally distinct from the Commission’s Secretariat. The Secretariat would support the Commission’s corporate, recruitment and disciplinary work, while the Administrative Office would provide professional services to the courts. Separate responsibilities and access controls would protect candidate information, disciplinary records, judicial records and confidential deliberations.
Judicial accountability and professional standards
The Commission would establish transparent, competitive and merit-based judicial recruitment processes. It would also receive complaints concerning judicial conduct, administer disciplinary measures authorized by law and investigate whether the constitutional standard for suspending or removing a judge has been met.
These responsibilities must respect judicial independence, security of tenure and procedural fairness. The Commission may not review whether a judicial decision was legally correct. A challenge to a judgment must proceed through appeal, review or another judicial remedy. A judge may not be disciplined merely because a decision is unpopular, reversed on appeal or contains an error made in good faith.
Administration without interference
The Commission would administer and serve the judiciary; it would not exercise judicial power.
It may not decide, review or influence a case, obtain access to confidential judicial deliberations, or use budgets, personnel, facilities, technology, transfers or security arrangements to reward or punish a judicial outcome. Individual cases must be assigned through neutral systems administered by the responsible court Registrar.
The Supreme Court retains its constitutional authority over its internal organization and operation. Lower courts similarly control their judicial business under the Judiciary Establishment Act and applicable Court Rules. The Commission provides the institutional support that enables courts to work effectively, but it may not direct how judges decide cases.
This distinction is fundamental. Judicial independence requires protection not only against direct political instruction but also against the manipulation of court budgets, personnel, records, facilities and technology. The proposed structure places those services within an independent constitutional institution while surrounding them with transparency, audit, functional separation and express prohibitions against interference.
Modern and accessible judicial service
The Commission would guide the responsible modernization of judicial administration. Its responsibilities would include supporting secure electronic filing and case management, establishing cybersecurity and data-protection standards, preserving judicial archives, and helping make judgments and public orders available in searchable and citable form.
Technology must improve access to justice rather than create another barrier. Physical and assisted alternatives must remain available. Artificial intelligence may assist research, translation, transcription, accessibility and document management, but it may not determine credibility, liability, guilt, sentence, constitutional validity or the outcome of a case. Judges remain personally responsible for their decisions.
By combining constitutional responsibility for judicial service with independent administration of the judiciary, the Commission is intended to help build courts that are professionally supported, publicly accountable, technologically capable and institutionally independent.