A Practical Roadmap for Implementing the Constitution of Eritrea

Implementing the Constitution of Eritrea means much more than declaring that the Constitution is in force. It means constructing the institutional and legal infrastructure required by the Constitution, transforming institutions inherited from the pre-constitutional period into institutions constituted and governed according to the Constitution, and ensuring that all public authority is thereafter exercised within constitutional limits.

Constitutional implementation has two connected dimensions. The first is institutional. Eritrea must establish the National Assembly, presidency, constitutional judiciary, Electoral Commission, Advocate General, Auditor General, National Bank, Civil Service Administration, Judicial Service Commission and the other institutions contemplated by the Constitution. The second is substantive. Once established, these institutions must respect every applicable provision of the Constitution in their daily conduct.

A constitution is not implemented merely because offices bearing the correct constitutional names have been created. It is implemented when public power is acquired, exercised, reviewed and transferred according to constitutional rules; when citizens enjoy the rights guaranteed to them; when government action can be challenged before independent courts; and when unconstitutional legislation, policies and administrative decisions can be invalidated and remedied.

The transition should therefore proceed in a deliberate sequence. Each step should provide the lawful authority and institutional capacity needed for the next.

The limited role of the transitional institutions

Only Eritrea’s existing pre-constitutional institutions can initiate the transition. Before constitutional elections are held, there is no constitutionally elected National Assembly capable of passing the necessary laws. Similarly, there is no President elected under Article 41 who can exercise the appointment powers assigned to the President by the Constitution.

The Transitional National Assembly and transitional executive must therefore undertake certain preliminary actions. Their role, however, should be interpreted narrowly. They are not supposed to make all the permanent political choices of the future constitutional order. Their essential responsibility is to open the constitutional door and allow institutions possessing democratic and constitutional legitimacy to enter.

This is a principle of transitional restraint. The pre-constitutional institutions should exercise only the authority reasonably necessary to:

establish an independent Electoral Commission;
enact the law governing the first National Assembly election;
provide temporary financing and administrative support for that election;
guarantee the civil and political rights needed for citizens to participate freely;
maintain essential public services during the transition; and
supervise an orderly transfer of authority to the institutions established under the Constitution.

The constitutional-implementation initiative begun by the Government of Eritrea in late 2000 and early 2001 was correct in its general direction. During that period, the government initiated work on legislation governing political organizations, National Assembly elections and the establishment of an Electoral Commission. These were the right preliminary subjects to address. In particular, establishing an independent election administrator and enacting a law for electing the National Assembly were indispensable steps toward activating the constitutional order. The important task now is not to dismiss those initiatives, but to complete and improve them in conformity with the Constitution, fundamental rights and contemporary standards for free and fair elections. A political-organizations law may protect freedom of association, but the first constitutional election need not depend on the prior formation of mature political parties.

The transitional authorities should not use this limited responsibility to entrench themselves, predetermine the election, control candidacies, or permanently fill offices that the Constitution entrusts to the future President and elected National Assembly. Whenever a decision can reasonably be left to constitutionally elected institutions, it should be left to them.

Step One: Make a public constitutional commitment

The process should begin with an official and unequivocal declaration that the purpose of the transition is to implement the Constitution ratified on 23 May 1997 and to establish government under it.

The declaration should publish a practical timetable, identify the initial legislation that must be enacted, and affirm that the transitional authorities will surrender their extraordinary authority when the constitutional institutions assume office. It should be accompanied by constitutional education explaining the rights of citizens and the responsibilities of the institutions to be established.

At the same time, the State must begin respecting the Constitution’s guarantees of human dignity, equality, due process, expression, association, peaceful assembly, conscience and political participation. These rights are not rewards to be granted after an election. They are constitutional commitments and necessary conditions for citizens to make meaningful electoral choices.

Political prisoners and persons held without lawful charge should receive independent judicial review. Citizens must be able to discuss public affairs, criticize government policies, obtain information, support candidates, meet peacefully and express political opinions without fear.

This does not mean that Eritrea must first develop a mature system of competitive political parties. The first constitutional election can be organized around the Eritrean citizen as an individual political agent. What is indispensable is freedom—not the prior construction of a complicated party system.

Step Two: Establish the independent Electoral Commission

Article 58 of the Constitution requires an Electoral Commission that operates independently and without interference. It entrusts the Commission with administering free and fair elections, deciding questions arising during the electoral process, and providing civic education concerning elections and democratic procedures.

The first major legislative act should therefore be a proclamation establishing the Electoral Commission.

The proclamation should define the Commission’s independence, composition, appointment process, tenure, financing, powers, accountability and internal administration. It should protect commissioners and professional staff from arbitrary removal and prohibit political direction of their electoral decisions.

The initial appointment process requires special care. Article 58 ordinarily provides that the Electoral Commissioner is appointed by the President with the approval of the National Assembly. During the first transition, however, neither institution is constituted in the manner prescribed by the Constitution. A temporary appointment procedure is therefore unavoidable.

That procedure should be exceptional, transparent and limited to organizing the first election. The transitional authorities should publish the qualifications of proposed commissioners, permit reasonable public objections and require appointees to demonstrate professional competence and political impartiality. Commissioners appointed through this temporary procedure should later be subject to confirmation or replacement through the ordinary constitutional process.

Read the Draft Electoral Commission Establishment Proclamation.

Step Three: Enact the National Assembly election law

After establishing the Electoral Commission, the Transitional National Assembly should enact a law providing for the first election of the National Assembly contemplated by Articles 30 and 31.

The law should determine:

eligibility to vote and stand for election;
voter registration;
delimitation of electoral districts;
candidate nomination;
campaigning and access to public media;
use of public resources;
polling and ballot secrecy;
counting and publication of results; and
complaints, recounts and judicial appeals.

The electoral system must be understandable to ordinary citizens. The ABC Journey uses 50 single-member seats as an educational model for exploring how a representative National Assembly might be organized. The number was not chosen arbitrarily or in the abstract. It rests on substantial research into Eritrea’s regions, principal cities, historic districts, village communities, settlement patterns, transportation corridors, pastoral territories, coastal and island communities, borderlands, demographic uncertainty, and the practical requirements of representation. The model may offer a workable structure for the real Eritrea, but it is not presented as a final constitutional or legal determination. Final decisions concerning the size of the Assembly and the boundaries of its constituencies would require reliable evidence, public consultation, independent electoral review, and lawful adoption.

Why 50 Seats?

A 100-member National Assembly would also be an excellent and easily understood model if broader representation is considered necessary. When all 100 seats are filled, each member corresponds to one percentage point of the Assembly’s total membership. This makes voting records, majorities, attendance, participation statistics, and legislative outcomes especially easy to explain through public and civic education. A 100-member Assembly would also provide more opportunities for communities and viewpoints to be represented. The ABC Journey therefore presents 50 seats as a carefully researched educational starting point, not as the only legitimate institutional design. The choice between 50 and 100 members should ultimately reflect evidence, public consultation, institutional capacity, and Eritrea’s representational needs.

This arrangement does not depend on political parties. Candidates can stand in their own names, and voters can evaluate their character, competence, judgment, public service, principles, knowledge of the district and commitment to constitutional government.

Citizens should remain free to cooperate, endorse candidates, form associations and eventually establish political organizations. But the first election need not wait for mature parties. Attempting simultaneously to construct a complete party system, regulate party finances, negotiate coalitions and conduct Eritrea’s first constitutional election could overload a fragile transition. A candidate-centered election provides a simpler and more attainable beginning.

Read the Draft National Assembly Election Proclamation.

Step Four: Finalize the electoral districts

The legally adopted electoral districts must be finalized through an independent and evidence-based process. The ABC Journey’s current educational model illustrates 50 single-member districts as a carefully researched starting framework, not a legally final settlement. Its research considers all six regions, principal cities, historic districts, village communities, settlement patterns, transportation relationships, remote lowlands, pastoral territories, coastal and island communities, borderlands, demographic uncertainty, and practical representational needs. That work suggests that a 50-member Assembly may be workable for Eritrea, while a 100-member Assembly remains an equally serious alternative if broader representation is required. The final number of seats and the final boundaries must be determined through reliable evidence, public consultation, independent Electoral Commission review, and law.

District names alone cannot constitute final legal boundaries. The Electoral Commission must consult local communities, examine the best available population information, respect villages and historically recognized weredas where practicable, and publish maps and written boundary descriptions.

Citizens should be able to inspect and object to proposed boundaries. Decisions should include written reasons and remain open to judicial challenge.

Because Eritrea lacks a recent reliable census, the first delimitation cannot achieve mathematical perfection. Limited population deviations may be justified for remote, island, pastoral, borderland and geographically concentrated minority communities. Such deviations must be explained publicly and must not be designed to favor a candidate, association, ethnicity, religion or governmental interest.

Step Five: Prepare and conduct the election

Once the legal framework is enacted, operational responsibility should pass to the Electoral Commission.

The Commission should:

publish the legally adopted electoral districts and their boundaries, represented by 50 districts in the current ABC Journey educational model;
establish an accurate and reviewable voter register;
register eligible individual candidates;
provide civic education in Eritrea’s languages;
train politically neutral election officials;
establish accessible polling stations;
accredit candidate representatives and independent observers;
accommodate remote communities, eligible citizens abroad and persons with disabilities;
protect ballot secrecy;
count ballots transparently at polling stations; and
publish detailed results promptly.

Candidates should be free to associate, adopt common positions and endorse one another. Nevertheless, the ballot can remain candidate-centered. Eligibility should not depend upon approval by a political party.

Security institutions must remain politically neutral. Their responsibility is to protect voters and the electoral process—not to monitor beliefs, intimidate communities or influence choices.

Electoral complaints should be decided promptly by independent adjudicators, with access to courts when constitutional or legal rights are involved. Results should be certified only after serious outcome-determinative complaints have been resolved.

Step Six: Convene the constitutional National Assembly

After certification of the results, the elected National Assembly should convene according to the Constitution and the electoral law. This is the decisive transfer from transitional authority to constitutional government. Once the elected Assembly is in office, permanent institution-building can proceed with full constitutional legitimacy.

The Assembly should verify members’ credentials, elect its Chairperson, adopt rules of procedure, establish its Secretariat and form standing committees. Its proceedings should ordinarily be public and recorded.

The Transitional National Assembly should then cease exercising legislative authority. There should be no indefinite overlap between transitional and constitutional mandates.

The elected Assembly derives its authority from the citizens. It must therefore be free to review, amend or replace temporary transitional measures through constitutional procedures.

Step Seven: Elect the President

One of the earliest and most important duties of the National Assembly is to elect the President of Eritrea.

Article 41 provides that the President is elected from among the members of the National Assembly by an absolute majority of all its members. A presidential candidate must be nominated by at least 20 percent of the Assembly’s entire membership. The presidential term is five years, corresponding to the term of the Assembly that elected the President, and no person may be elected President for more than two terms.

This has an important practical consequence: anyone with the ambition to become President of Eritrea must first be elected as a member of the National Assembly. The Constitution does not provide for a separate popular presidential election, nor does it permit the Assembly to select the President from outside its membership. A prospective President must first persuade the citizens of a legally adopted electoral district to elect that person to the National Assembly and must then persuade an absolute majority of the entire Assembly.

The Assembly should adopt transparent procedures for nominations, candidate presentations, balloting, counting and announcement of the result. The election must comply strictly with Article 41.

Upon the constitutional President’s assumption of office, transitional executive authority should end. State records, public property, security responsibilities and administrative functions should be formally transferred.

Step Eight: Transition the existing Cabinet into the constitutional Cabinet

Transitioning the existing Cabinet of Ministers into the constitutional Cabinet should be the easiest institutional task. If Eritrea possesses a comparatively strong and experienced institution, it is the executive administration, including the Cabinet and its ministries.

There is no need to dismantle a functioning executive apparatus merely because its constitutional foundation must change. Ministries must continue providing health care, education, public works, financial administration, foreign relations, security and other essential services.

The necessary change is primarily constitutional and legal. Existing ministers must cease deriving authority solely from transitional arrangements and must instead hold office according to the Constitution.

Under Articles 39 and 42, the President is Head of State and Government and exercises executive authority in consultation with the Cabinet. The President nominates ministers, but their appointment requires National Assembly approval. Cabinet formation is therefore a shared constitutional responsibility.

The constitutional President may nominate some or all existing ministers. If they are competent and receive Assembly approval, they may continue in office. This preserves administrative experience while changing the legal source and accountability of their authority. Only modest adjustments may be required to transform the existing Cabinet into the Cabinet of the constitutional order.

Assembly approval must nevertheless be meaningful. Nominees should disclose their qualifications, responsibilities, financial interests and potential conflicts. Once appointed, ministers must be subject to legislative oversight, judicial review and constitutional limitations.

Step Nine: Bring the judiciary and existing laws into conformity

Constitutional government cannot become operational without an independent judiciary capable of enforcing the Constitution, reviewing governmental action, protecting legal rights, resolving disputes, and requiring every public authority to remain within the law. The judiciary is not merely another administrative institution to be adjusted. It is an independent, co-equal branch of constitutional government.

The Judiciary as a Co-Equal Branch

The Constitution vests judicial power in the Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Courts must be free from the direction or control of any person or authority. Judges are subject only to the law, the judicial code of conduct, and their conscience. State institutions must provide the assistance necessary to protect the independence and dignity of the courts.

Judicial independence requires more than formal language. Courts need lawful jurisdiction, competent and impartial judges, secure administration, adequate budgets, accessible procedures, reliable records, professional staff, and practical authority to issue remedies that bind the government. Public officials and security institutions must comply with judicial orders.

Constitutional Role of the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court is Eritrea’s court of last resort and is presided over by the Chief Justice. It has sole jurisdiction to interpret the Constitution and to determine the constitutionality of legislation and governmental action. It also has sole jurisdiction over charges brought against a President following impeachment, hears appeals from lower courts as provided by law, and determines its own internal organization and operation.

These responsibilities place the Supreme Court at the center of constitutional enforcement. It must be capable of deciding constitutional disputes independently, giving reasoned judgments, protecting rights, and ensuring that legislation, executive action, and every public institution remain within constitutional limits.

Composition and Appointment of the Supreme Court

The Constitution does not prescribe a fixed number of Supreme Court justices or determine their tenure. Those matters must be established by law in a manner that supports independence, competence, continuity, and manageable judicial administration. Any ABC Journey illustration of a three-justice Supreme Court is an educational or institutional proposal only; three is not a number fixed by the Constitution.

The appointment process differs for the Chief Justice and the other Supreme Court justices. The Chief Justice is appointed by the President with the approval of the National Assembly. The Constitution does not expressly assign the Judicial Service Commission a role in nominating the Chief Justice. The other justices of the Supreme Court are appointed by the President upon the proposal of the Judicial Service Commission and with the approval of the National Assembly.

Legislation may permit the Judicial Service Commission to publish qualification standards, provide technical assistance, or offer nonbinding professional advice concerning the office of Chief Justice. Such assistance must not displace the President’s constitutional nomination power or the National Assembly’s approval authority.

Role of the Judicial Service Commission

For the other Supreme Court justices, the Judicial Service Commission’s proposal is an important safeguard against appointments based on political loyalty, personal allegiance, ethnicity, religion, or executive preference. The Commission does not itself appoint judges. Its constitutionally authorized proposal should result from a professional process that includes:

publicly stated qualification and integrity standards;
open or publicly announced recruitment;
merit-based professional assessment;
verification of qualifications and experience;
conflict-of-interest and integrity review;
consideration of competence, independence, temperament, fairness, and commitment to constitutional government;
a reasoned shortlist or proposal;
presidential appointment from the constitutionally authorized Commission proposal;
meaningful National Assembly review and approval; and
transparent procedures consistent with legitimate confidentiality requirements.

The Commission also protects judicial independence through recommendations concerning judicial recruitment and conditions of service and through its constitutional responsibilities in judicial removal and suspension procedures. Those responsibilities should be exercised according to published law, fair procedure, professional evidence, and institutional independence.

Establishment and Administration of Lower Courts

Lower courts should be established by law with clearly defined jurisdiction, accessible procedures, adequate geographic coverage, and effective appellate review. Lower-court judges are appointed by the President upon the proposal of the Judicial Service Commission. Court administration should protect decisional independence while providing transparent budgeting, professional staffing, case management, public records, and reasonable access to justice.

Review of Existing Laws for Constitutional Conformity

Existing laws may remain temporarily effective to prevent a legal vacuum, but only insofar as they are consistent with the Constitution. The elected Assembly should establish a systematic constitutional-review program covering laws on detention, criminal procedure, national service, the press, associations, public finance, land, citizenship, administrative authority, and security institutions.

Where an old law conflicts with the Constitution, the Constitution must prevail. An unconstitutional rule should not continue to be enforced merely because it predates the constitutional transition. Courts must be able to review disputed governmental action and provide effective remedies, while the Assembly and executive must revise laws and practices before avoidable violations occur.

Step Ten: Establish the other constitutional institutions

With an independent judiciary addressed as a co-equal branch in Step Nine, the elected National Assembly and constitutional President should establish the remaining constitutional institutions in the manner prescribed by the Constitution. Presented alphabetically, they are as follows.

Advocate General

Article 54 requires an Advocate General and leaves the office’s powers and duties to legislation. The proclamation should clarify responsibility for public prosecutions, legal advice to the government, representation of the State and protection of the public interest.

Prosecutorial authority must be exercised according to law, evidence and due process—not political instructions.

Read the Draft Advocate General Proclamation.

Auditor General

Article 55 requires an Auditor General who audits government revenues, expenditures and other financial operations and reports annually to the National Assembly.

The Auditor General is appointed for five years by the President with Assembly approval and is accountable to the Assembly. The office must have access to public records, professional independence and authority to publish its findings.

Read the Draft Auditor General Proclamation.

Civil Service Administration

Article 57 requires a Civil Service Administration responsible for recruitment, selection and separation of civil servants and for determining their employment conditions, rights, duties and code of conduct.

This institution should transform the existing administration into a professional and politically impartial constitutional civil service. Existing employees need not be dismissed. Their positions can be regularized under constitutional standards based on competence, equal opportunity and lawful procedure.

Read the Draft Civil Service Administration Proclamation.

Electoral Commission

After the constitutional President and Assembly assume office, the Commission’s transitional composition should be reviewed under Article 58. The Electoral Commissioner should thereafter be appointed by the President with Assembly approval.

These appointment powers do not authorize interference. The Commission must remain independent while maintaining voter registration, reviewing districts, conducting civic education and preparing future elections.

Read the Draft Electoral Commission Establishment Proclamation.

Judicial Service Commission

Article 53 requires a Judicial Service Commission responsible for recommendations concerning the recruitment of judges and their terms and conditions of service.

The Commission is essential to judicial independence. Judicial appointments and discipline should depend on competence, integrity and lawful professional standards—not executive preference or political loyalty.

Read the Draft Judicial Service Commission Proclamation.

National Bank

Article 56 requires a National Bank that performs central-bank functions, controls financial institutions and manages the national currency.

The Governor is appointed by the President with Assembly approval, while the Board’s members are appointed by the President. The proclamation should protect professional monetary and regulatory functions while ensuring transparency and public accountability.

Read the Draft National Bank Proclamation.

Step Eleven: Make constitutionalism the ordinary practice of government

Implementation does not end after institutions are created and officials appointed. Constitutionalism means respecting the entire Constitution and following it in the ordinary conduct of government.

Nothing done by the government should be contrary to the Constitution. Every ministry, official, security institution, court and public agency must derive its authority from the Constitution or from subsidiary legislation consistent with it.

The population must actually enjoy all the rights provided by the Constitution. Rights cannot remain promises on paper. Citizens should routinely be able to exercise freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, association, conscience, equality, due process and political participation.

Citizens must also be able to challenge the constitutionality of legislation, government policies and official actions. Constitutional litigation should not be regarded as hostility toward the State. It is one of the ordinary mechanisms through which the Constitution governs the State.

When a violation is established, courts must be able to provide effective remedies, including:

declaring legislation unconstitutional;
invalidating unlawful policies, regulations and decisions;
issuing injunctions against threatened violations;
ordering officials to perform constitutional duties;
releasing unlawfully detained persons;
restoring denied rights; and
awarding appropriate monetary compensation.

Court orders must bind the government. A constitutional judgment that the executive may disregard is not an effective judgment, and a right without an effective remedy is not a secure right.

Constitutional government also requires regular Assembly meetings, public legislative deliberations, approved budgets, independent audits, judicial review, periodic elections and peaceful transfers or renewals of authority. The five-year electoral cycle and the presidential two-term limit must be treated as binding commands.

The civic and entertainment value of constitutional democracy

A properly functioning constitutional democracy also has genuine entertainment value. That is not a trivial benefit. Democratic political life gives the population a continuing national story in which citizens are active participants rather than passive recipients of official announcements.

Elections produce anticipation, debate, personalities, surprises, victories, defeats and peaceful changes in political fortune. Legislative proceedings allow citizens to observe representatives displaying judgment, courage, preparation, humor—and sometimes confusion or incompetence. Political mistakes and public controversies become subjects of open national discussion rather than whispered private frustration.

Supreme Court cases create their own constitutional drama. Citizens, lawyers, journalists and students can follow arguments, debate constitutional provisions, anticipate judgments and examine the reasoning of judges. An important decision can educate the country while resolving a genuine dispute.

This authentic civic entertainment benefits the media. Newspapers, radio, television and digital platforms gain meaningful public material from elections, candidate debates, legislative hearings, budgets, audit reports, constitutional cases and government responses. It can also benefit the economy by supporting work in journalism, communications, legal practice, polling, broadcasting, technology, printing, research and civic education.

Above all, democratic political life gives citizens something in which to take pride. A constitutional culture develops when people know their Constitution, debate its meaning, celebrate its successes, criticize its failures and expect public institutions to follow it.

That is fundamentally different from the dullness of repressive orders such as Eritrea’s present system or North Korea’s extreme model. Where disagreement, competition and uncertainty are suppressed, official politics becomes predictable, repetitive and lifeless. Constitutional democracy converts political disagreement into a lawful, consequential and often compelling public activity. Its entertainment value is authentic because the outcome is not predetermined: arguments matter, personalities matter, votes matter, judgments matter—and citizens matter.

The constitutional sequence

The roadmap can be summarized as follows:

The transitional authorities enact only the indispensable starting laws → an independent Electoral Commission is established → the National Assembly election law is enacted → constitutional freedoms are secured → the legally adopted electoral districts are finalized, illustrated by 50 districts in the current ABC Journey educational model → citizens elect individual representatives → the constitutional National Assembly assumes authority → the Assembly elects the President from among its members → the existing Cabinet is adjusted and approved as the constitutional Cabinet → the judiciary and existing laws are brought into conformity → the President and Assembly establish the other constitutional institutions → every institution thereafter governs under the Constitution.

The objective is not to dismantle Eritrea’s administration and begin from nothing. Existing offices, employees, ministries and essential services can continue. What must change is the legal source, constitutional limitation and public accountability of their authority.

Ultimately, implementing the Constitution means accepting that every institution and every official is subordinate to it. Neither the President, National Assembly, Cabinet, courts, armed forces, security services nor any political organization may stand above the constitutional order. The Constitution must determine how power is obtained, exercised, challenged, remedied and relinquished. Only when these principles govern actual public life—not merely the language of official proclamations—can Eritrea be said to have completed its transition from pre-constitutional rule to constitutional government.

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